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CORPORATE WEALTH OVER PUBLIC
HEALTH? ASSESSING THE RESILIENCE
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ COVID-19
RESPONSES AGAINST INVESTMENT
CLAIMS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES
Tim Hagemann*

ABSTRACT
In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, states around the
world swiftly enacted a multitude of far-reaching emergency
responses to contain the viruses’ spread and to cope with the
economic repercussions of the ensuing crisis. However, these
measures detrimentally impacted the operating conditions of
many businesses or, at the least, decreased their profitability.
As this inevitably affected foreign investments, investors could
be tempted to invoke “Investor State Dispute Settlement”
(“ISDS”) clauses in International Investment Agreements (IIAs)
to initiate proceedings before arbitral tribunals and seek
compensation for loss of profit caused by states’ Covid-19
responses. Due to the specific circumstances in most developing
countries, they were hit particularly hard by the crisis and are
especially vulnerable to the threat of investment claims. It is
therefore important to enable developing countries to
realistically anticipate the risk of investment arbitration by
assessing the chances of success of foreign investment claims
against those policies that were most frequently adopted by
them amidst the crisis. Against this background, this paper
assesses how likely developing countries’ Covid-19 responses
breached substantive standards of investor treatment under
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typical IIAs and which defense strategies states may invoke to
justify their regulatory action. Based on this analysis, this paper
concludes by formulating policy recommendations on how
developing countries may enhance the resilience of their
emergency responses against foreign investors amidst future
public health crises.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the outbreak of SARS-CoV-1 in 2002, health
experts have warned governments of the scenario of a globally
evolving pandemic.1 Yet, when the World Health Organization
(WHO) first learned of the existence of SARS-CoV-2 (“Covid-19”)
on New Year’s Eve 2019,2 not even the most pessimistic experts
anticipated that the world was on the edge of a historic public
health crisis that would, within just one year, cause over 2
million casualties, severely impair the globalized economy, and
impact the lives of the world’s population in an unprecedented
manner.3 Indeed, it was not until the end of January, when the
WHO first classified Covid-19 as a “public health emergency of
international concern,”4 and later as a “pandemic,”5 that most
governments became clearly aware of the severe and imminent
threat to human health posed by the virus.6
Many countries reacted swiftly by adopting emergency
measures that included drastic restrictions of business activities
such as the closing of factories and retail outlets, restriction of
international trade, or government takeover of entire sectors.7

1 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung [Briefing by the Federal
Government], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen[BT]17/12051,
https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/120/1712051.pdf (Ger.).
2 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 1, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf
[hereinafter Situation Report 1].
3 How COVID-19 is changing the world: a statistical perspective, Volume
III, COMM. FOR COORDINATION STAT. ACTIVITIES 3 (2020),
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf.
4 Statement on the second meeting of the International Health
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel
coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meetingof-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committeeregarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov).
5 Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a
Pandemic, 91 ACTA BIOMEDICA 157, 157 (2020).
6 Situation Report 1, supra note 2, at 3–5.
7 See Oriol Güell & Inés Santaeulalia, Spanish government puts private
healthcare firms at the orders of the regions, EL PAÍS ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://english.elpais.com/society/2020-03-16/spanish-government-putsprivate-healthcare-firms-at-the-orders-of-the-regions.html (discussing how
Spain took all private hospitals and healthcare providers under government
control).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/2

4

Fall 2021

Corporate Wealth Over Public Health?

29

However, by attempting to contain the virus, they involuntarily
added an economic dimension to their public health crisis.8
According to predictions by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the world economy shrunk by 4.4% and even the volume
of internationally traded goods and services decreased by 10.4%
in 2020.9 As a consequence, numerous businesses had to close,
over 100 million jobs were permanently lost, and more than 90
million people, predominantly in developing countries, fell under
the threshold of extreme poverty.10
Considering these severe repercussions, some foreign
investors may be tempted to question the compliance of states’
Covid-19 responses with their obligations under IIAs. With only
very limited exceptions,11 the vast majority of IIAs provide
investors with an ISDS mechanism, i.e. with the opportunity to
initiate arbitral proceedings against the host state where they
see their investment unduly impaired by its actions.12 While so
far, there has been no case where an investor has actually made
use of ISDS in relation to states’ Covid-19 responses, this should
not obscure the fact that foreign investors are aware of their
rights and willing to invoke them whenever they expect an
advantageous outcome. This is underscored by the fact, that
only within a few months after the outbreak of the virus,

Güell & Santaeulalia, supra note 7.
To put these numbers into perspective, even the Global Financial
Crisis of 2008–2009 reduced global growth by a comparably low 0.1%. IMF, A
Long and Difficult Ascent, World Economic Outlook xiii, 9 (Oct. 2020)
[hereinafter IMF WEO 2020].
10 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Trade and Development Report 2020 From Global Pandemic to Prosperity for all: Avoiding another lost Decade,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2020, at I-II (2020) [hereinafter UNCTAD TDR
2020].
11 For instance, Brazil omits Investor-State Dispute Settlement
mechanisms completely from its BITs; instead, so-called “Dispute Prevention”
mechanisms are implemented. See Arush Mittal, Bilateral Investment Treaty
Between India and Brazil: A Dispute Prevention Mechanism, CBCL BLOG
(July 17, 2020), https://cbcl.nliu.ac.in/trade-law/bilateral-investment-treatybetween-india-and-brazil-a-dispute-prevention-mechanism/.
12 KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 11–12 (Edward Elgar Publ’g, 3d ed. 2020).
8
9
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investors had already threatened Peru13 and Mexico14 to initiate
ISDS on grounds of their Covid-19 responses, and similar
threats against other governments followed shortly thereafter.15
Developing countries with their comparably lower financial
capacities should not rely on investors’ restraint to demand
compensation amidst a public health crisis, but instead should
be cautious of potential pitfalls when crafting their Covid-19
responses.
Due to the existence of certain common features, which will
be further elaborated in the first chapter, the Covid-19-Crisis
confronts developing countries with a unique economic and
public health challenge that makes them particularly
susceptible to investment claims. Consequently, this article will
systematically analyze the chances of success of ISDS claims
that are directed against developing countries’ Covid-19
measures and provide recommendations on how they may
improve the resilience of their emergency responses for future
public health crises.
Structurally, this article seeks to accomplish this goal by
first assessing the economic and public health impact of the
pandemic on developing countries and why this makes them
particularly vulnerable to Covid-19 related investment claims.
The second chapter will discuss the most commonly adopted
measures that potentially interfere with foreign investments.
The third chapter will then analyze if these measures likely
violated the most commonly invoked substantive standards of
investment protection. The fourth chapter will consequently
examine in detail which defenses developing countries have at
their disposal to justify their otherwise wrongful behaviour and
how likely these will hold up before arbitral tribunals. Finally,

13 Cosmo Sanderson, Peru warned of potential ICSID claims over covid19 measures, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1225319/peru-warned-of-potentialicsid-claims-over-covid-19-measures.
14 Cosmo Sanderson, Mexico faces potential claims over pandemic
response, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (May 22, 2020),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1227136/mexico-faces-potentialclaims-over-pandemic-response.
15 E.g., against Argentina’s public debt restructuring. See Cecilia Olivet
& Bettina Müller, Juggling crises: Latin America’s battle with COVID-19
hampered by investment arbitration cases, TRANSNAT’L INST.: LONGREADS
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://longreads.tni.org/jugglingcrises.
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the fifth chapter will then consider the preceding analysis to
recommend policies that would put developing countries in a
better position to craft more resilient emergency responses in
times of public health crises.
II. THE VULNERABILITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AMIDST
THE COVID-19-CRISIS
Developing countries were affected particularly hard by the
repercussions of the Covid-19 crisis: not only were they heavily
tormented by the pandemic itself but – in contrast to former
economic crises – also severely hit by the ensuing economic
recession.16
While the term “developing country” has recently come
under scrutiny for its purported scientific blurriness,17 this
article will not position itself in the ongoing debate but will
rather follow the classification utilized by the IMF, which
instead distinguishes low and middle-income countries (LMICs)
from more developed economies.18 This decision results from a
pragmatic approach that explains the situation most LMICs are
experiencing amidst the pandemic on the basis of certain
economic and public health conditions this group of countries
share.
A. Public Health and Economic Conditions
First, most LMICs suffer from underfunded health care
systems which only provide citizens with a very limited access
to health care facilities and a comparably low standard of
hygiene and treatment.19 This extremely limits their capacity to

16 According to the UNCTAD, the severe economic repercussions of the
Covid-19-crisis will likely result in a “lost decade” for developing countries
regarding the accomplishment of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). See UNCTAD TDR 2020, supra note 10, at II.
17 See Tariq Khokhar & Umar Serajuddin, Should we continue to use the
term “developing world”?, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-termdeveloping-world (questioning the use of the term “developing word” to
describe dissimilar countries).
18 See, e.g., IMF, How do Climate Shocks Affect the Impact of FDI, ODA
and Remittances on Economic Growth?, WP/21/193, 13 (June 2021) (using
“LMIC” categories to describe subgrouping of developing countries).
19 Ryan Cronk & Jamie Bartram, Environmental conditions in health

7

32

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 34.1

appropriately respond to severe public health emergencies as
illustrated by their exceedingly high Covid-19 mortality rates.20
The public health situation is further aggravated by the fact that
many higher-income countries have already secured large
quantities of Covid-19 vaccines which, in turn, makes it
extremely difficult for LMICs to purchase relevant amounts. 21
As a consequence, vaccinations are progressing very slowly in
LMICs and it is expected that herd immunity will not be
accomplished in the foreseeable future.22
Second, the economic conditions in most developing
countries make them especially prone to the effects of the
recession.23 On the one hand, most LMIC economies are
positioned on the lower end of the “Global Value Chain” (GVC)
and, as such, mostly export commodities to industrialized
economies.24 With decreasing economic activity by the industry
of commodity importing countries amidst the pandemic, prices
for raw materials have declined by 21.5% since January 2020.25
This directly led to a devaluation of those countries’ currencies

care facilities in low- and middle-income countries: Coverage and inequalities,
221 INT’L J. HYGIENE & ENV’T. HEALTH 409, 420 (2018); Anne Mills, Health
Care Systems in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED.
552, 552 (2014).
20 Lars Jensen & George Gray Molina, COVID-19 and health system
vulnerabilities in the poorest developing countries, UNDP GLOB. POL’Y
NETWORK BRIEF – HEALTH 3 (July 2020).
21 See J. Peter Figueroa et al., Urgent needs of low-income and middleincome countries for COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics, 397 LANCET 562,
562 (2021) (explaining the challenges of the COVID-19 vaccine in low- and
middle- income countries).
22 See Victoria Rees, Rich countries buy up majority of COVID-19 vaccine
doses, People’s Vaccine Alliance says, EUR. PHARMACEUTICAL REV. (Dec. 10,
2020), https://www.europeanpharmaceuticalreview.com/news/136170/richcountries-buy-up-majority-of-covid-19-vaccine-doses-peoples-vaccine-alliancesays/ (discussing that civil society organizations are already warning that the
stockpiling of vaccine by developed countries means that only one in every
ten LMIC citizen will be able to get vaccinated by the end of 2021).
23 Figueroa et al., supra note 21, at 564.
24 See generally Jakob Engel & Daria Taglioni, The middle-income trap
and upgrading along global value chains, WTO (2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gvcs_report_2017_chapter5.pdf
(explaining the impact of a export driven economy in relation to the Global
Value Chain).
25 See UNCTAD TDR 2020, supra note 10, at 22 (reporting that the price
for fuel commodities decreased 36.9% in 2020, disproportionately impacting
developing countries).
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and thus contributed to a drastic increase of foreign debt. 26 At
the same time, decreasing commodity prices meant a sharp
decline in government revenues, which left most developing
countries unable to afford wide-ranging stimulus measures like
those initiated in more developed economies. 27
Assessing the public health and economic background of
developing countries is important for understanding the ISDS
environment in which this article navigates for two reasons.
First, lack of adequate health care capacities and insufficient
access to vaccines will prolong the period in which restrictions to
economic activities will be necessary.28 This will increase both
the probability of foreign investors filing for investment
arbitration and the corresponding damages claimed. Second,
containing the virus by restraining business operations without
the capacity to initiate appropriate economic stimulus will likely
lead to a further deterioration of the economic situation for the
state and its citizens.29 The drastic increase of poverty could
spawn social unrest and create a situation where states feel
compelled to stabilize their economy and restore social peace by
promulgating drastic economic relief measures that impair
foreign investments. The recourse to ISDS would not be without
precedent in such a situation. For example, when Argentina
faced a severe economic recession around the turn of the

26 See generally id. at 26 (stating that the causality between currency
devaluation and debt increase stems from the fact that the external debt of
most developing countries is repayable in foreign currencies, and if the home
currency loses value in comparison to the currency of the loan, the state must
invest more financial means to repay its debt).
27 See UNCTAD TDR 2020, supra note 10 at 15.
28 See generally M. Mofijur et al., Impacts of COVID-19 on the social,
economic, environmental, and energy domains: Lessons learnt from a global
pandemic, 26 SUSTAINABLE PROD. & CONSUMPTION 343, 343–59 (2020)
(suggesting that interdisciplinary involvement, healthcare improvements,
sustainable development, and others are key aspects of recovery from the
COVID-19 pandemic).
29 According to predictions by the World Bank, extreme poverty rose in
2020 for the first time in the last two decades. By the end of 2020, almost
10% of the global population will be affected by extreme poverty. Most
notably, over around 80% or 72 million of those people newly pushed under
the poverty line stem from middle-income countries. See WORLD BANK GRP.,
POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2020: REVERSALS OF FORTUNE 1, 5–6, 149
(2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34496/9781464
816024.pdf.
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millennium, its ensuing efforts to restructure its debt prompted
investors to file fifty ISDS proceedings30 which were found to
violate substantive standards of investment protection under
several IIAs and eventually culminated in awards obliging
Argentina to pay compensation in the amount of more than 1.6
billion USD.31
B. Regulatory Chill
Against the threat of potential compensatory claims
amounting to billions of USD, some developing countries may be
tempted to refrain from adopting necessary public health
responses where investor interests could be impaired. The
theory of “Regulatory Chill” assumes that the looming threat of
investment arbitration and the financial risks associated with
its outcome impedes states’ willingness to promulgate
regulatory measures in the public interest. 32 This is especially
problematic for many LMICs, whose economies – even in times
of economic upturn – would be severely impaired by detrimental
ISDS outcomes.33 While a considerable number of recently
signed IIAs contain provisions aimed at defusing this situation
by better balancing states’ regulatory autonomy with foreign
investor interests, it is worth noting that they are still vastly
outnumbered by treaties that do not contain such provisions. 34
For instance, in 2017, these old-generation treaties still made up
for 95% of all IIAs in force,35 and all fifty-five investment claims
initiated in 2019 were based on such treaties, 70% of which were
30 Frederico Lavopa, Opinion: Crisis, Emergency Measures and Failure
of the ISDS System: The Case of Argentina, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/08/opinion-crisis-emergencymeasures-and-failure-of-the-isds-system-the-case-of-argentina/.
31 Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina’s Litigation and
Arbitration Saga, 2002-2016, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 41, 75 (2016).
32 Atif M. Alenezi, Preventing the Regulatory Chill of International
Investment Law and Arbitration, 9 INT’L L. RSCH. 85, 85 (2020).
33 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/30, Award, 329 (Mar. 8, 2019) (serving as a drastic example
where the claimants were granted a compensation of over 8.5 billion USD, an
amount that surpasses the entire annual budget of a large portion of LMICs).
34 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Phase 2 of IIA Reform: Modernizing the
Existing Stock of Old-Generation Treaties, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/3, at 3, 14 (2017) [hereinafter Phase 2 of IIA
Reform].
35 Id. at 3.
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against developing countries.36
But irrespective of the IIA’s substantive standards,
arbitration remains a very costly affair. The average costs for
the parties’ legal representation, the arbitrators’ fees and
charges, and institutional fees and charges stand at over nine
million USD,37 and there are cases where the costs of litigation
even exceeded this amount by the factor twelve.38 Irrespective
of the outcome, tribunals frequently split these litigation costs
among the parties.39 While these numbers might sound
relatively low compared to the compensatory claims outlined
above, it must be noted that for many LMICs with limited
financial capabilities, the litigation costs alone would amount to
a considerable percentage of their annual budget and may thus
deter LMICs from taking regulatory action.40
Thus, developing countries are facing a dilemma: they may
either adopt emergency measures to mitigate the crisis and risk
costly foreign investor claims or refrain from such action and
aggravate the public health and economic situation even further
– potentially to the point where they have no other choice than
to intervene anyways. Accordingly, their only choice to overcome
this dilemma is to craft resilient Covid-19 responses capable of
prevailing before investment tribunals.
III. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ COVID-19 RESPONSES
In the course of their Covid-19 responses, developing
countries adopted a wide range of different measures to contain
36 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2020 International Production beyond the Pandemic, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2020, at 110–11 (2020).
37 See Diana Rosert, The Stakes Are High: A review of the financial costs
of investment treaty arbitration, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 8 (2014),
https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/stakes-are-high-reviewfinancial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf.
38 See, e.g., Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Fed’n, PCA Case
No. 2005-03/AA226, Award, 576 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014) [hereinafter Hulley]
(observing that the claimant’s costs for legal representation amounted to
79,628,055.56 USD and an additional 1,066,462.10 GBP).
39 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 562.
40 Compare Belize, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (last updated Oct. 12, 2021),
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/belize/#economy
(demonstrating that in Belize, the litigation costs of the Hulley arbitration
alone would amount to over 1/5 of the annual government revenue), with
Hulley, supra note 38 (highlighting the high cost of litigation).
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the spread of the virus and deal with the crisis’ economic
consequences.41 While they are tailored to fit the specific
circumstances of their domestic environment, it is noteworthy
that certain types of measures are commonly adopted
throughout LMICs.42 Certain of these measures are particularly
prone to play a role in investment arbitration because they
either negatively affect the conditions under which foreign
investors operate in the host state, restrict trade and market
access, interfere with due process of law, or indirectly threaten
investors’ interests.43
Investors’ operating conditions are impaired if Covid-19
measures negatively affect investors’ capacity to manufacture
products, supply services, or otherwise enjoy their investment.44
A particularly popular type of regulation that deprives investors
of the enjoyment of their investment is the suspension of utility
bills, i.e., payments for water, gas, telephone, electricity and like
services that citizens receive.45 An illustrative example for this
category can be found in El Salvador, where the government
temporarily freed people and businesses affected by the crisis
from paying their electricity, phone, and internet bills and froze
payments for mortgages, rent, and loans.46 Another example is
a Peruvian regulation that, under the pretext of protecting toll
booth workers from contracting Covid-19, fully suspended road

41 François Gerard et al., Social protection response to the COVID-19
crisis: options for developing countries, 36 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 281,
281–82 (2020).
42 Rajiv Chowdhury et al., Long-Term strategies to control COVID-19 in
low and middle-income countries: an options overview of community-based,
non-pharmacological interventions, 35 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 743, 743 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7354877/pdf/10654_2020_Arti
cle_660.pdf; see also Leila Abdullahi et al., Community interventions in LowAnd-Middle-Income Countries to inform COVID-19 control implementation
decisions in Kenya: A rapid systematic review, PLOS ONE 1, 3, 19 (2020)
(describing the common measure implemented).
43 Julien Chaisse, Both Possible and Improbable – Could COVID-19
Measures Give Rise to Investor-State Disputes?, 13 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 99,
123 (2020).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 David A. Wemer, What Latin American countries are doing to confront
coronavirus, ATL. COUNCIL (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-latin-americancountries-are-doing-to-confront-coronavirus/.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/2

12

Fall 2021

Corporate Wealth Over Public Health?

37

toll collection for the country’s highway system.47 Yet, the most
severe interferences were the imposition of so-called “lockdowns”
or “shutdowns,” i.e. emergency measures aimed at enforcing
social distancing obligations by restricting businesses, declaring
curfews, closing private and public spaces of social interaction,
or imposing quarantines.48
Moreover, a considerable number of measures may raise
questions on their compliance with due process of law because of
the system of rules and procedures that are envisaged to protect
private rights from undue state interference.49 In other words,
these are measures that disregard prescribed judicial and
administrative rules and procedural safeguards to the detriment
of the investor. In the context of states’ Covid-19 responses, this
is particularly relevant in cases where states seized investors’
property in the early stages of the outbreak without regard for
the appropriate procedure.50 Another relevant factor may be the
closure or limited access to courts and tribunals which led to the
interruption or rescheduling of many trial proceedings, which
precluded investors from effective judicial remedy in cases
where their investments were detrimentally affected.51 Due

47 See Sanderson, supra note 13 (explaining possible arbitration by
private toll booth concessionaires who were prohibited from collecting road
tolls by the Peruvian government in March 2020).
48 While many states imposed lockdowns to curb the pandemic, one of
the most severe set of measures was employed by India, where, at its height,
nearly all types of businesses including factories, restaurants and retail
stores were compelled to cease operations. See Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India issues Orders prescribing lockdown for containment of
COVID-19 Epidemic in the country, Release No. 1607997 (Issued on March
24, 2020); see also Xiaohui Chen & Ziyi Qiu, COVID-19: Government
interventions and the economy, VOXEU & CEPR (May 13, 2020),
https://voxeu.org/article/government-interventions-covid-19-and-economy
(describing the widespread imposition of strict measures to contain the
virus’s spread).
49 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 132.
50 See id. at 133 (describing the authorization that some Chinese city
governments had to temporarily seize private property from private entities
without adhering to prescribed administrative procedures).
51 See COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean: An overview of
government responses to the crisis, OECD 17 (2020), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/view/?ref=129_129907-eae84sciov&title=COVID-19-in-LatinAmercia-and-the-Caribbean_An-overview-of-government-responses-to-thecrisis (explaining the use of an online judiciary as a replacement to in person
proceedings); see also Laney Zhang, China: Supreme People’s Court Issues
Online Litigation Rules, Addressing Review of Blockchain Evidence, LIBR.
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process might also be undermined by governments exploiting
the crisis to tighten their grasp on the country in declaring a
state of emergency and giving themselves extraordinary
powers.52 In many cases, this includes the dismantling of many
rights and procedural safeguards along with limited legislative
and judicial supervision over the exercise of those powers.53
Consequently, where such emergency powers are used to
interfere with investors’ enjoyment of their investment, these
measures may be particularly vulnerable to investment claims.
Although many measures do not directly target foreign
investments, they may do so indirectly. Most importantly, these
are measures that relate to the restructuring of public debt.54 As
outlined above, developing countries’ debt has surged amidst the
pandemic to such a degree that it may soon be necessary for
some to declare a state default if they are unable to adopt drastic
restructuring measures.55
However, such restructuring

CONG. (2021), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-07-21/chinasupreme-peoples-court-issues-online-litigation-rules-addressing-review-ofblockchain-evidence/ (explaining how China’s Supreme People’s Court
published an order for all lower courts to move litigation to a new online
system).
52 Venezuela: A Police State Lashes Out Amid Covid-19, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 28, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/28/venezuela-police-state-lashes-out-amidcovid-19# (describing how the Venezuelan government declared a state of
alarm in March 2020 and granted President Maduro wide ranging powers to
adopt Anti-Covid measures without effective judicial or legislative oversight);
see generally Frances Z. Brown et al., Commentary, How Will the
Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/06/how-will-coronavirus-reshapedemocracy-and-governance-globally-pub-81470 (arguing that the Cambodian
Prime Minister obtained virtually unlimited power to adopt any kind of
measure in the country’s fight against Covid-19 and as one of several African
states, Togo allowed its president to rule virtually unchallenged by decree).
53 Magnus Lundgren et al., Emergency Powers in Response to COVID-19:
Policy Diffusion, Democracy, and Preparedness 5-6 (Stockholm Univ.,
Research Paper No. 78, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3641384.
54 Lundgren et al., supra note 53, at 122, 155.
55 Covid-19 related state defaults have indeed already happened in
Lebanon and Zambia and experts expect more to follow. See Homi Kharas &
Meagan Dooley, COVID-19’s legacy of debt and debt service in developing
countries 5 (Center for Sustainable Development at Brookings Institution,
Working Paper No. 148, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/COVID-19-legacy-of-debt_final.pdf.
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measures are particularly prone to provoke investment
arbitration as seen by the recent examples of Greece 56 and
Argentina.57 Thus, when the latter attempted to restructure its
debt again in August 2020, its debtors immediately confronted
Argentina with threats of investment arbitration that pushed
the country to largely accept the demands. 58 Finally, some
developing countries adopted tax concessions and deferrals for
their businesses and nationals.59 As this has already spawned
ISDS proceedings in the past, developing countries should be
especially careful not to craft or apply these measures
discriminatorily by affecting the competitive relationship
between domestic businesses and foreign investors. 60
In conclusion, developing countries have enacted a
multitude of measures that target, or at least indirectly impair,
foreign investments.
Naturally, the noncompliance with
investors’ interests is not per se an indicator for a measure’s
illegality.
Nevertheless, it can be concluded from this
assessment that if investors initiate ISDS proceedings, they will
likely be on the grounds of the aforementioned measures. In the

56 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. The Hellenic Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award, 13, 33 (April 9, 2015) (demonstrating that
during the height of the European Financial Crisis in 2012, the Troika
offered financial help subject to the condition that Greece would reduce the
face value of their sovereign bonds, which influenced bond holders, like the
Slovakian Postova Banka, but worsened the restructuring efforts and
resorted to arbitration).
57 From 1991 to 2001, Argentina gave out sovereign bonds in the amount
of almost 140 billion USD but saw itself unable to repay them amidst a
severe economic crisis in the early 2000s. When in 2005, Italian bond owners
rejected Argentinian debt restructuring measures which foresaw a severe
reduction of its bonds’ face value, they initiated investment arbitration. See
Kai-Wei Chan, The Relationship Between the International Investment
Arbitration and Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 229,
233 (2014).
58 Olivet & Müller, supra note 15.
59 For instance, Viet Nam extended the deadlines for tax and land use
fee payments for businesses suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic and
introduced an income tax reduction of 30% for the 2020 financial year. Policy
Responses to COVID-19, INT’L MONETARY FUND (July 1, 2021),
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID19.
60 Amrit Bhatia, Covid-19 and Standards of Investment Protection, 38
YOUNG ARB. R. 23, 25 (2020) (explaining that in Feldman v. Mexico, the host
state was found to have violated its National Treatment obligation by unduly
offering tax rebates to domestic resellers of cigarettes).
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following sections, there will be further analyses to assess the
chances of success before investment tribunals.
IV. POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE IIA PROVISIONS
As of January 2021, there were 2,258 Bilateral Investment
Treaties and additionally 324 Treaties with Investment
Provisions in force.61 While these treaties are all individually
crafted to fit the circumstances of the involved parties, the
overwhelming majority of IIAs share certain common standards
of investment protection.62 These include the obligations of Fair
and Equitable Treatment (FET), National Treatment, MostFavoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, the prohibition of unlawful
expropriation, and the commitment to provide investors with
Full Protection and Security (FPS).63 While this chapter will
assess the compliance of developing countries with those
standards very broadly, it is important to note that the
predictability of investment arbitration is limited by two
decisive factors: the circumstances of the individual case and the
interpretation given by the tribunal for the relevant substantive
standard, which will be reflected in the following analysis.64
A. Fair and Equitable Treatment
FET has long been a controversial issue between proponents
and critics of the investment law regime.65 On the one hand,
FET remains immensely popular with foreign investors, as it
has become the most litigated and successful substantive
standard for investment claims.66 On the other hand, critics
61 Investment Policy Hub - International Investment Agreements
Navigator, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationalinvestment-agreements (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
62 Alenezi, supra note 32, at 86 (recognizing the existence of customary
international standards used by IIAs).
63 Id. at 86–88.
64 See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Fair and Equitable Treatment:
UNCTAD Series on International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, at 29 (2012) (discussing how outcomes of
investment arbitration are unpredictable due to varied interpretations of
relevant fair treatment clauses) [hereinafter FET: UNCTAD].
65 Nicholas Wiggins, T-Tip Negotiations Round Two: An Opportunity to
Redirect the Trajectory of International Investment Law, 169 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
1289, 1314 (2021).
66 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
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have outlined the vagueness of FET and the associated lack of
predictability regarding its interpretation by investment
tribunals, which makes it difficult to anticipate violations and
effectively restraints states’ steering capacity to regulate for the
public good.67 Not surprisingly, the UNCTAD identified the FET
standard as one of the major issues of the current investment
law regime that frustrates developing countries’ ambitions to
realize the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and explicitly
argued for its reform.68
1. Scope
The main reason for its ambiguous reception is the fact that
FET’s often vague formulation tempted investment tribunals to
interpret the standard in various ways.69 For instance, some
tribunals interpret FET as the minimum standard of treatment
prescribed under customary international law.70 Dating back to
the “Neer Arbitration” of 1926, a state was held to breach FET,
if its conduct amounted to an outrage of injustice, bad faith,
willful neglect, or a pronounced degree of improper
governmental action.71 Nowadays, most tribunals recognize the
standard of treatment where the relevant FET provision directly
references customary international law.72
In contrast, where the relevant IIA lacks any reference to
customary international law, the vast majority of investment
tribunals interpret FET as an autonomous standard of investor
treatment whose scope must be assessed independently of other
substantive standards and the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law.73 Subsequently, the vague
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 130 (OUP, 2d ed. 2012).
67 FET: UNCTAD, supra note 64, at 2.
68 FET: UNCTAD, supra note 64, at 14.
69 Nicolette Butler & Surya Subedi, The Future of International
Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment Organisation?, 64 NETH.
INT’L L. REV. 43, 51 (2017).
70 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 627 ICSID Rep. (2009).
71 L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4
R.I.A.A. 60, 61–62 (1926).
72 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 66, at 137.
73 Id. at 133; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican
States (Tecmed v. Mexico), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 155
(2003); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 110 (2004).
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language of FET provisions gave tribunals significant discretion
in determining their scope and led to a substantially higher level
of investment protection than the “Neer standard.”74 Although
investment tribunals emphasized the circumstances of the
specific case,75 they soon developed several recurring elements
that are usually considered to determine a violation of FET. 76
These elements are the prohibition to take on measures
arbitrarily without purpose or explanation, to deny investors
justice and due process of law, to discriminate on wrongful
grounds, to coerce or harass, or to frustrate the legitimate
expectations of investors vis-à-vis the investment.77
It is especially the latter ground on which the majority of
tribunals concentrate their assessment of FET.78 Since the
beginning of widespread FET litigation, the interpretation of
legitimate expectations has undergone a significant evolution.
Some tribunals in the early 2000s defined “legitimate
expectations” from the investor’s subjective point of view and
hence as comprising all of the basic expectations regarding the
investment.79 This would entail that all rules and regulations
that concern the investment must have been outlined to the
investor prior to the undertaking of the investment and may not
be changed to its detriment.80 This very demanding approach
has since been replaced by a more nuanced view of tribunals that
emphasizes whether investors’ expectations are “legitimate.”81
Nowadays, virtually all tribunals base the legitimacy of
expectations on specific representations made to the investor by
the host state.82 Additionally, tribunals now give greater
deference to states’ public policy choices.83 Only where the

SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 401.
Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 118 (2002).
76 FET: UNCTAD, supra note 64, at xv-xvi.
77 Id. at xvi.
78 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 437.
79 Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, ¶ 154.
80 Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, ¶ 154.
81 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 430.
82 See inter alia Ioan Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award,
¶ 669–70 (2013) (“This promise, assurance or representation may have been
issued generally or specifically, but it must have created a specific and
reasonable expectation in the investor.”).
83 Id. at ¶ 266.
74
75
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state’s failure to treat investors fairly and equitably outweighs
its sovereign right to regulate for the public good, will a breach
of the FET standard be found (“Right to Regulate”).84
Nevertheless, tribunals retain a high level of discretion
regarding the assessment and elements of FET which led to an
incoherent arbitral practice that still makes it difficult for states
to foresee where the line between investor and host state
interest will be drawn.85
Accordingly, states are now actively seeking to narrow the
scope of the FET standard in new IIAs by linking FET to the
customary international law standard of treatment, explicitly
referencing the elements that tribunals are allowed to consider
in finding a violation or omitting it altogether.86 Yet, most oldgeneration IIAs that predominantly form the basis for
investment claims against developing countries still operate
under unrestricted FET clauses.87 Accordingly, to assess the
resilience of developing countries’ Covid-19 responses, it is
necessary to base the following analysis of specific measures on
the broad interpretation of FET as an autonomous standard.
2. Imposition of Lockdowns
As outlined in the preceding chapter, many LMICs tempted
to curb the spread of the pandemic by imposing strict lockdowns
on its citizens and businesses during the height of the Covid-19
outbreak. Where these measures shut down retail outlets and
industrial production like in India,88 the potential for impairing
foreign investments is particularly high. This puts tribunals in
the position to assess if the relevant measure is a legitimate
exercise of regulatory power or if it unduly impairs foreign
investments. In this regard, tribunals give particular weight to

84 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 284. (2010).
85 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 450.
86 See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Policy options for IIA reform: treaty
examples and data, Supplementary material to World Report 2015,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/133/policy-options-for-iiareform-treaty-examples-and-data (last updated June 24, 2015) (explaining
the IIA regime’s push to link FET to customary international law).
87 Id.
88 Annexure to Ministry of Home Affairs, Order No. 40-3/2020-D (Issued
on March 24, 2020) (India).
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the principle of proportionality, i.e. the obligation to ensure that
state conduct is suitable, necessary and not excessive in view of
the pursued policy objective.89 Hence, where states go beyond
what is seen as proportionate by tribunals in light of all
stakeholders’ rights and interests, a state measure might not
comply with FET.
In the context of lockdowns, tribunals will likely agree that
the imposition of strict social distancing measures that
effectively reduce the risk of contracting the virus is generally
suitable to curb the pandemic. However, they still may call into
doubt if the strict closing of factories and retail outlets and the
imposition of curfews that subsequently interfered severely with
the profitability of investments was necessary and
proportionate. While there is solid evidence that hard lockdowns
do indeed play an important role in containing the pandemic,90
other studies called into question if its benefits outweigh the
accompanying detrimental mental health and economic effects.91
Indeed, tribunals could find the most severe forms of
lockdown to be excessive where the data already indicated a
serious decline in Covid-19 cases, or critically scrutinize the
necessity of certain lockdown measures such as the closing of
industrial facilities with very little personal interaction.92
However, it should be noted that tribunals are inclined to grant
states a margin of appreciation for assessing the effectiveness of
public health regulation.93 For instance, in Philip Morris v.
Uruguay, the majority of arbitrators rejected the premise that
the host state had to produce evidence for a measure’s
effectiveness to attain an envisaged public health goal.94
Instead, the tribunal found the WHO’s assessment that the
89 Hydro Energy 1 S.À R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/42, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Directions on Quantum, ¶
573–74 (2020).
90 Paul Smith, Hard lockdown and a “health dictatorship”: Australia’s
lucky escape from covid-19, BMJ (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/371/bmj.m4910.full.pdf.
91 Hasan Ahamed et al., Lockdown Policy Dilemma: COVID-19
Pandemic versus Economy and Mental Health, 3 J. BIOMEDICAL ANALYTICS 37,
38, 49 (2020).
92 Bhatia, supra note 60, at 27.
93 Philip Morris Brands SÀRL. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 388, 399 (2016).
94 See id. at ¶ 396 (This was inter alia based on the difficulty to provide
such evidence in a future “hypothetical scenario”).
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underlying policy rationale was sufficiently evidence-based to
satisfy the element of proportionality.95 Yet, it should be noted
that the third arbitrator in the case firmly rejected the
lawfulness of a margin of appreciation under the applicable BIT
and international law and instead argued that the absence of
evidence provided by the host indicates the disproportionality of
the measure.96 This underscores the large discretion tribunals
enjoy in their assessment of the boundaries of public policy
decisions where the relevant IIA does not specify the scope of
FET.97 It should also be noted that in the current situation, the
WHO critically reflects on the negative repercussions of the
imposition of lockdowns and instead recommends to only apply
them restrictively “where and when needed” to slow down the
transmission of Covid-19.98 While tribunals usually grant states
a large degree of deference for pursuing public health
objectives,99 this should not be misinterpreted as a carte blanche
for the imposition of severe lockdowns. Tribunals retain the
discretion to demand a higher standard of evidence for the
effectiveness of Covid-19 related measures.100 States should
therefore be cautious not to implement severe lockdowns
without considering its negative repercussions and taking
adequate countermeasures or might potentially be found to
violate the applicable FET standard.
3. Emergency Powers
As elaborated above, several governments in developing
countries have utilized this crisis to confer themselves
emergency powers that are normally reserved to the legislative
branch and widely exceed their regular constitutional capacities

95 Id.; See also Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uru.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Amicus Curiae Brief, ¶ 10 (2015).
96 See Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 5, 125 (2016).
97 Tania Voon, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Implications for Public Health,
18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 320, 328 (2017).
98 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Herd immunity, lockdowns and
COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-andcovid-19.
99 Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, ¶ 399.
100 See Chaisse, supra note 43, at 118-19.
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to act.101 Without the scrutiny of the legislature and their
moderating influence, state of emergency powers are
particularly prone to result in arbitrary treatment.102
Consequently, this could become an issue of investment
arbitration where they are employed arbitrarily to the
disadvantage of investors to, for example, close their businesses
and factories or otherwise reduce the profitability of their
investments.
According to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in
ELSI, the concept of arbitrariness describes a range of different
measures that, due to their deliberate disregard for due process,
are incompatible with the rule of law.103
Subsequently,
numerous tribunals recognized the ICJ’s high threshold by
adding some new factors in their assessment of arbitrariness or
narrowing its scope even further.104 Nowadays, several types of
measures can be identified as arbitrary by tribunals. 105 These
include measures that do not serve a legitimate purpose, are
intended to harm the investor while pretending to pursue a
public policy goal, are not based on legal standards but personal
discretion, or that deliberately disregard due process and
procedure.106
In the context of Covid-19 related emergency measures, the
latter two elements play a particularly important role. This is
highlighted by the case of Venezuela which serves as a rather
drastic but illustrative example for how unrestrained state of
emergency powers may lead to arbitrary policy making.107 On

Id. at 119.
Bhatia, supra note 60, at 24; Chaisse, supra note 43, at 135.
103 See Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J.
15, ¶ 128 (July 20) (“Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule
of law, as something opposed to the rule of law [. . .]. It is a willful disregard
of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of
judicial propriety.”).
104 See Alex Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award,
¶ 371 (2001) (adding the element of bad faith to the arbitrariness definition);
see also Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 221 (Sept. 3, 2001)
(requiring an arbitrary measure to be also discriminatory or prejudicial).
105 Christoph Schreuer, Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory
Measures, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 186–87 (Catherine A.
Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
106 Schreuer, supra note 105, at 188.
107 Jesús María Casal Hernández & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, States
of Emergency without Rule of Law: The Case of Venezuela, VERFASSUNGSBLOG
101
102

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/2

22

Fall 2021

Corporate Wealth Over Public Health?

47

13 March 2020, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro declared
a state of alarm that granted him virtually unchallenged powers
to rule by decree.108 These powers were then used to impose
social and economic lockdowns, even stricter price controls, and
more governmental influence over private entities.109 However,
these measures are based on a precarious legal framework. The
executive disregarded the constitutional procedure that
prescribes the approval of any state of alarm by the National
Assembly and instead prolonged the president’s emergency
powers over the constitutionally accepted period of time.110
Moreover, instead of following the procedure set out by the state
of alarm and issuing the corresponding measures in the relevant
decrees, Maduro frequently resorted to public announcements
and modified the scope and content of the measures at will.111
At the same time, undue interference of the executive branch
with the state’s court system has rendered rule of law and
judicial oversight virtually non-existent in Venezuela over the
last years.112
As outlined above, tribunals will generally grant states a
considerable margin of appreciation for pursuing their public
health objectives. However, the displayed degree of disregard
for due process of law and legal procedure will make it difficult
for Venezuela and similarly acting states to argue that their
regulatory action complied with FET. As a result, investors that
see the profitability of their investments arbitrarily impaired by
such emergency measures (e.g. in the form of lockdowns or price
controls), may be relatively well positioned to claim a breach of
the host’s FET obligation.
4. Denial of Justice
Another key factor of due process of law, and of FET, is the

(May 22, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/states-of-emergency-without-ruleof-law-the-case-of-venezuela/.
108 Id.
109 Hernández & Antoniazzi, supra note 107.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Presents Preliminary
Observations and Recommendations Following Historic On-Site Visit to
Monitor the Human Rights Situation in Venezuela (May 8, 2020).
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international legal concept of denial of justice. 113
After
114
exhausting all local remedies,
a denial of justice can be
invoked where the host state’s courts refuse to hear a case
brought by an investor, subject it to undue delays, administer
justice inadequately, or clearly and maliciously misapply the
law.115
Accordingly, investors may claim that the closure of the
host’s court system during the height of the Covid-19-outbreak
and the subsequent interruption and rescheduling of court cases
in relation to their investment precluded them from seeking
effective judicial remedy.116 A relevant number of LMICs may
argue that they had neither the appropriate financial capacities
nor the technical infrastructure to establish alternative
procedures such as online hearings.117 However, it is important
to note that denial of justice is an objective standard that is not
subject to the resources that the host has at his disposal.118
Consequently, tribunals will have to assess the legitimate
interest of states to protect the health of judicial officials while
considering that the conduct by states must not reach the
threshold of denial of justice. 119 Many countries avert this
threshold by following the model of India which exclusively
allowed court proceedings in matters of urgency, i.e. cases
concerning life and death or imminent seizure or destruction of
property.120 Or is it reasonable to demand that states make use
of modern technology like mainland China, that swiftly changed
its proceedings to an online format to keep distortions to judicial

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 66, at 174.
Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 164 (2009).
115 Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶ 102–103 (1999).
116 Bhatia, supra note 60, at 24–25.
117 Id.
118 See Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. Republic of
Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 76 (2009) (noting in regard to
denial of justice that “a relativistic standard would be none at all”).
119 Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. Republic of
Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 76 (2009).
120 Sayra Kakkar, Global Court Functioning and the Impact of COVID19 on Arbitration, JURIST (May 17, 2020, 3:04 AM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/sayra-kakkar-court-functioningcovid19/.
113
114
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proceedings to a minimum?121 The answer to this question
cannot be assumed in general and will ultimately rely on the
individual circumstances of the case, especially the duration of
the procedural delays, the urgency of judicial relief and the
investor interest at stake.
B. Unlawful Expropriation
Being one of the most severe interferences with foreign
investments imaginable, the prohibition of unlawful
expropriation,122 is a key substantive standard that can be found
in virtually every IIA in force. It is important to note that the
expropriation of foreign investments is not per se a violation of
international law and explicitly provided for in most IIAs. 123
This means that states retain the right to lawfully expropriate
foreign property if they comply with the relevant conditions set
out in the applicable IIA or customary international law.124
Generally, the expropriation must be conducted for a public
purpose, in accordance with due process of law, applied nondiscriminatorily, and against adequate compensation.125 In
turn, where the conduct of a state does not comply with all of
these conditions, the expropriation becomes unlawful.126 The
investor can then claim financial compensation not only for the
expropriated investment but also for the loss of expected future
profits,127 which will have devastating consequences for
developing countries with limited financial capacities.
1. Scope
There are two categories of expropriation: direct and
indirect expropriation.128 Direct expropriation is a process that
Id.
SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 207.
123 Id. at 243, 252.
124 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 66, at 99–100.
125 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 254.
126 David Khachvani, Compensation for Unlawful Expropriation:
Targeting the Illegality, 32 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L. J. 385, 395 (2017).
127 The Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgement, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 17, at 17, 47 (Sept. 13); Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 353 (2007).
128 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc.
121
122
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involves the seizure or mandatory legal transfer of a property’s
legal title by the state. 129 Due to the negative incentives for
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) set by expropriating foreign
investors’ properties, this has become exceedingly rare in the
recent past.130 In contrast, indirect expropriation does not
involve the seizure or transfer of title of a foreign investment by
the state, but produces effects tantamount to expropriation by
depriving the investor of any meaningful opportunity to enjoy
his investment.131 This is recognized for instances where the
state “neutralized” the investment. Neutralization describes a
substantial interference with the investment that lasted a
sufficiently long period of time and caused a severe loss of value,
profitability, or managerial control.132
However, the
neutralization of an investment does not necessarily mean that
it has been unlawfully expropriated. In the cause of evolving
case law, tribunals have recognized that the interest of investors
to protect their investment must be counterweighed by the
states’ interest to adopt regulations for the general welfare.133
Unfortunately, diverging case law on this issue makes it
difficult to anticipate where a tribunal will find an indirect
expropriation for which the state owes the investor adequate
compensation and where it will reject a claim in the context of
the state’s right to regulate for a public interest. For instance,
until recently, most tribunals treated every state act that
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, at 128 (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD
Expropriation].
129 Id. at 6.
130 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 66, at 101; but see Campbell v.
Republic of Zim., SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007, Judgement, 44 (2008)
(highlighting that they did not disappear completely, especially in the context
of ongoing post-colonial ethnic and land conflicts in Southern Africa).
131 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 66, at 101; UNCTAD Expropriation,
supra note 128, at 7.
132 It should be noted that it is disputed when a state interference is
severe enough to amount to a neutralization. See Tippetts. v. TAMS-AFFA, 6
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984) (reasoning that every interference that is
not merely ephemeral would constitute a severe interference); see LG&E
Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision of
the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 23 (Apr. 30, 2004)
(setting the bar considerably higher by requiring a severe deprivation of the
investor’s rights or an almost complete annulment of the investment’s value);
see also SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 255, 259.
133 Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶ 253 (2006) [hereinafter Saluka].
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neutralized a foreign investment as indirect expropriation
without considering the state’s motivation for that act (“Sole
Effects Doctrine”).134
However, tribunals nowadays overwhelmingly acknowledge
the state’s sovereign right to regulate as a rule of customary
international law.135 Accordingly, where the state acted in good
faith to attain a public policy objective and adhered to the
principles of reasonableness, non-discrimination, due process of
law, and proportionality, tribunals will interpret a regulation
not as an unlawful expropriation but as a lawful exercise of its
regulatory powers (“Police Power Doctrine”).136 Even though the
term “Police Power Doctrine” is mostly associated with indirect
expropriation and it has been argued that its application is
limited to corresponding claims,137 it must be noted that its
concept largely overlaps with the “Right to Regulate” discussed
above and is often used synonymously by tribunals.138
Consequently, tribunals grant states a high degree of deference
in cases of alleged indirect expropriation where a regulation
seeks to accomplish a public policy goal in a reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and proportionate fashion.139 While the doctrine

134 See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.20 (2007); Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s
Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 133. (2009); AES
Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, ¶ 14.3.1 (2010).
135 See Saluka, supra note 133, ¶ 262 (“[T]he principle that a State does
not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a
dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are
commonly accepted as within the police power of States’ forms part of
customary international law today.”).
136 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶ 235, 240 (2011); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, ¶ 176(j) (2006);
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 195 (Oct. 3, 2006).
137 Alain Pellet, Police Powers or the State’s Right to Regulate, in
BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID 447,
457 (Kinnear et al. eds, 2016); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Decision
on Liability, ¶ 148 (July 30, 2010).
138 See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 423 (Oct. 2, 2006) (utilizing the term
“right to regulate” in a similar manner as the police power doctrine).
139 Maryam Malakotipour, The Chilling Effect on Indirect Expropriation
Clauses on Host States’ Public Policies: a Call for a Legislative Response, 22
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is applicable to every type of sovereign policy making,140 it is
worth noting that it is particularly rooted in public health
regulation going back as far as 1903, when an arbitral tribunal
recognized states could not be held liable for reasonably
exercising their regulatory powers vis-à-vis foreign nationals’
property to contain an infectious disease.141
Nevertheless, tribunals retain a high degree of discretion in
drawing the line between rightful execution of public policy
objectives and unlawful expropriation that revolves around their
individual assessment of the elements of reasonableness, nondiscrimination, and proportionality. The resulting uncertainty
for states has created concerns that this could deter them from
regulating in the public interest.142 Accordingly, many recent
treaties narrow the scope of indirect expropriation by explicitly
referencing factors that constitute or exclude its applicability or
even omit the element of indirect expropriation altogether.143
Yet, similar to the situation regarding the reform of the FET
standard, most IIAs in force still include unrestrained provisions
on indirect expropriation.144 Thus, the assessment of the
following measures will be based on the unrestrained scope of
indirect expropriation in these old-generation IIAs.
2. Requisition of Foreign Property
In the wake of the crisis, some governments resorted to the
requisition of medical supplies and equipment as well as to the
seizure of properties and businesses as part of their Covid-19
INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 235, 239 (2020).
140 Catharine Titi, Police Powers Doctrine and International Investment
Law, in 12 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 323,
324 (Andrea Gattini et al. eds., 2018).
141 See, e.g., Bischoff, 10 R.I.A.A. 420, 420 (1903) (noting the court denied
a damage claim against Venezuelan police after they seized a carriage from a
German businessman amidst a smallpox epidemic because the tribunal ruled
that the taking constituted a reasonable exercise of police authority amidst a
dangerous health crisis).
142 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 283.
143 See Phase 2 of IIA Reform, supra note 34, at 11; see also
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of
the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other
part, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L11) 23, 272 (clarifying that some measures,
specifically public health regulations, as seen in CETA, have been indirectly
excluded from the scope of expropriations).
144 Phase 2 of IIA Reform, supra note 34, at 11.
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response.145 As outlined above, the expropriation of foreign
property is not per se unlawful under IIAs and customary
international law. For instance, if medical supplies were seized
non-discriminatorily against the payment of an adequate
compensation and regard for due procedure to increase the
state’s capacity to curb the pandemic, the expropriation will be
likely found lawful.
However, where states temporarily requisitioned foreign
property without mandatory transfer of title or paying adequate
compensation, investors may claim that they were subjected to
unlawful indirect expropriation.146 Indeed, tribunals recognized
an unlawful expropriation where the state temporarily seized a
foreign owned property in such circumstances.147 Yet, there is a
considerable disagreement on the question of how long the
interference with the investment must have lasted to amount to
expropriation.148 Where one tribunal rejected a claim based on
a measure that lasted 18 months,149 a period of just one year was
sufficient for another.150 Yet, in the context of the Covid-19crisis, most properties have been returned within several
months after the outbreak once the first wave of the virus had
been sufficiently under control. Accordingly, tribunals may
likely reject the claim of indirect expropriation where states did
not acquire permanent or at least longer lasting control over the
foreign investment.
Even where the circumstances justify the assumption of an
indirect expropriation, it must be considered that under the
police power doctrine, tribunals grant states a considerable
degree of deference for regulating in the public interest.151 Only
where they find that a regulation does not comply with the
principles of reasonableness, non-discrimination, due process
Chaisse, supra note 43, at 119.
UNCTAD Expropriation, supra note 128, at xi.
147 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, Award, ¶ 99 (2000).
148 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 260.
149 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial
Award, ¶ 284 (Nov. 13, 2000).
150 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, supra note 147, ¶¶ 82,
99.
151 “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International
Investment Law 8 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper No.
4, 2004).
145
146

29

54

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 34.1

and proportionality, the claim of an unlawful indirect
expropriation might be accepted.152 In this context, tribunals
will particularly assess if the interference was excessive in view
of the investors’ legitimate expectations and if the expropriatory
conduct duly regarded the corresponding procedure. Especially
the latter element could become problematic for those
developing countries that resorted to court closings amidst the
pandemic.
Indeed, tribunals recognized an unlawful
expropriation where the courts could not provide adequate
protection for the expropriated investor.153 This raises questions
similar to those in relation to FET concerning the fair
equilibrium between the protection of court officials and access
to a judicial remedy.154 Indeed, several states such as India seem
to have already acknowledged the importance of due process of
law in the context of expropriation and excepted corresponding
cases from the general suspension of court proceedings.155
3. Suspension of Utility Payments
As illustrated by the examples of Peru and El Salvador, the
suspension of utility payments has been another popular
measure among many developing countries to curb the economic
repercussions of the Covid-19-crisis.156
Although the
investments’ legal title remains with the investor in these cases,
its effects could nevertheless be tantamount to expropriation
and thus potentially constitute an unlawful indirect
expropriation.157 Indeed, there can only be little doubt that the
state’s interference with the investment was substantial. The
suspension of road tolls in Peru and phone, internet, and
electricity bills in El Salvador deprived investors from any
meaningful opportunity to generate income and, in turn, the
enjoyment of their investment.158
Id. at 6-7.
See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Award, ¶ 292 (1984) (explaining that the Jakarta Appellate Court’s judgment
was insufficient regarding the Indonesian party’s rights).
154 Id. ¶¶ 198-203.
155 See Kakkar, supra note 120.
156 Sanderson, supra note 13 (explaining how Peru eased the
transportation costs of essential goods during the Covid-19 pandemic).
157 See id.
158 Id.; See Wemer, supra note 46; Foreign investment in Latin America
152
153
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Yet, policies suspending the payment for utilities have so far
been exclusively designed as short-term measures to help
citizens curb the immediate financial hardships associated with
states’ lockdown policies.159
As outlined above, short
interferences do not suffice the time component of
expropriation.160 Accordingly, it is unlikely that tribunals will
hold that the suspension of utility payments as enacted by states
in the wake of the Covid-19-crisis is tantamount to
expropriation. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact
that unrestrained suspension policies could indeed amount to
indirect expropriation and thus be subject to an assessment of
reasonableness and proportionality by the tribunal.
C. Full Protection and Security
The concept of the FPS standard is to protect investors and
their investments from physical harm by third parties and state
organs.161 However, this does not imply strict liability of the host
for every injury sustained by the investor,162 but instead entails
the obligation to diligently adopt all measures that are necessary
to protect the investor.163 What is especially important in this
context is the fact that the standard of due diligence is not an
absolute one but relative to the financial and institutional
capacities of the host state.164

expected to halve in 2020, UNCTAD (June 16, 2020),
https://unctad.org/news/foreign-investment-latin-america-expected-halve2020 (explaining the lack of foreign investors in Latin America due to the
pandemic’s impact on local economies).
159 E.g., Chaisse, supra note 43, at 123 (explaining that utility payments
in El Salvador were suspended for only three months, from March to June
2020).
160 UNCTAD Expropriation, supra note 128, at 69.
161 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 384.
162 Asian Agric. Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 49 (1990) (“[A]n obligation to provide ‘protection
and security’ or ‘full protection and security required by international law’ . . .
could not be construed according to the natural and ordinary sense of the
words as creating a ‘strict liability’ . . . The State into which an alien has
entered . . . is not an insurer or a guarantor of his security.”).
163 Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No.
ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.05 (1997).
164 Pantechniki v. Alb., supra note 118, ¶ 77 (discussing the need for
consistent application of protection and security in order to prevent civic
disorder).
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Furthermore, some tribunals have expanded the scope of
protection of FPS beyond mere physical security as an obligation
of the host to create a stable and secure commercial and legal
environment.165 This would mean that theoretically, the host
may not only be held liable for the impairment of the investor’s
health, but also for subsequent regulatory changes which would
not have been necessary if adequate preventive containment
strategies were taken in the early stages of the pandemic.166
However, considering that even states with the most
advanced economies were not able to prevent the outbreak and
further spread of Covid-19 in their territories,167 it is unlikely
that developing countries will be held liable for the failure to
fully contain the virus where they diligently adopted measures
to curb the pandemic.
D. Non-Discrimination
The obligation of host states to treat investors nondiscriminatorily is another key element of IIAs. In practice, the
principle of non-discrimination is implemented in the form of a
general prohibition of discriminatory treatment and is
accompanied by more specific national and MFN treatment
obligations.168 They all have in common that they prohibit less
favorable treatment of investors in like circumstances without
proper justification169 but differ in terms of the relevant

165 See Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶ 174
(Sept. 1, 2009) (defining full protection and security as going “beyond
protection and security ensured by the police. It is not only a matter of
physical security; the stability afforded by a secure investment environment
is as important from an investor’s point of view.”); see also Biwater Gauff
(Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award,
¶ 729 (July 24, 2008) (adhering “to the Azurix holding that when the terms
‘protection’ and ‘security’ are qualified by ‘full’, the content of the standard
may extend to matters other than physical security.”); see also CME Czech
B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 613 (Sept. 13, 2001) (requiring
the host State “to ensure that neither by amendment of its laws nor by
actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and
protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn of devalued.”).
166 Bhatia, supra note 60, at 24–25.
167 Dyani Lewis, Why many countries failed at COVID contract-tracing but some got it right, NATURE (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03518-4.
168 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 359.
169 Id. at 376.
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reference groups and the grounds for the differential
treatment.170 While the general prohibition of discriminatory
treatment obliges the host not to subject the investor to
detrimental treatment on the basis of their race, gender, or sex,
national and MFN treatment include the nationality of the
investor.171 In turn, MFN treatment obliges hosts not to treat
foreign investors disadvantageously in relation to third-party
investors while national treatment prescribes the same duty visà-vis the host’s own nationals.172
In the context of states’ Covid-19 responses, the latter could
become an issue of investment arbitration where the host state’s
economic relief measures have discriminatory effects on foreign
investors.
As outlined above, some developing countries
resorted to tax deferrals and concessions to address the
detrimental economic repercussions of the crisis. 173 This could
become problematic, where states craft or apply tax measures in
a way that treats its own nationals or third-party investors more
advantageously,174 even if the discriminatory effects are
involuntary.175 However, the principle of non-discrimination as
a standard of investment protection is limited by two elements.
The first is the relevant treaty language, used in a considerable
number of recent treaties, that narrows the applicability of the
national and MFN treatment standard by excluding tax
measures from their scope.176 The second is the fundamental
170 See id. at 362, 371 (comparing one tribunal’s “any-investor-iscomparable” approach to determining likeness to another’s “only-directcompetitors-are-comparable” approach).
171 Id. at 358.
172 SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 376.
173 See Policy Responses to COVID-19, supra note 59 (summarizing the
key economic responses 197 governments are taking to limit the human and
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic).
174 For instance, in cases where host states conferred tax reductions and
deferrals exclusively to domestic actors, tribunals have acknowledged a
violation of the relevant national treatment obligation. See Marvin Feldman
v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 188
(2002).
175 Nowadays, the vast majority of tribunals regard discriminatory
intent neither as a necessary nor sufficient precondition for the existence of
discrimination. See SCHEFER, supra note 12, at 358–59.
176 Julien Chaisse, Investor-State Arbitration in International Tax
Dispute Resolution - A Cut above Dedicated Tax Dispute Resolution?, 35 VA.
TAX REV. 149, 162 (2016). It should be noted that the broad exclusion of tax
measures from national and MFN treatment is a more recent development to
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principle that differential treatment is not prohibited where it is
justified by the public interest.177 As outlined in the first
chapter, the Covid-19-crisis severely impaired developing
countries’ economies.178
Naturally, these states have a
significant interest in protecting their domestic industry and
businesses from peril and indeed, tribunals have acknowledged
that safeguarding the solvency of important local industries
constitutes a legitimate base for differential treatment.179
Against this background and given the severity with which
many LMICs were hit by the economic effects of the Covid-19crisis, tribunals will likely grant them a significant leeway for
adopting corresponding relief measures.
V. DEFENSES AGAINST COVID-19 RELATED INVESTMENT CLAIMS
Even if a tribunal will recognize that a measure employed
by a state in conjunction with its Covid-19 response amounts
prima facie to a violation of its obligations under the relevant
IIA, the state may still successfully argue that the wrongfulness
of its conduct was warranted through a relevant exception. Most
notably, the arsenal of defenses on which developing countries
may rely and which will be outlined further in this chapter can
be put into two categories: defenses that are explicitly set out in
the applicable IIA and those that relate to the state’s
responsibility under customary international law.
A. IIA-based Defenses
An emerging trend among a number of more recent IIAs is
the explicit incorporation of provisions that allow states to
disregard their treaty obligations where they act to protect a
safeguard states’ regulatory capacity in tax matters and as such, the majority
of IIAs in force do not contain them. See id. at 164.
177 In their assessment of potential justifications, tribunals “must also
take into account circumstances that would justify governmental regulations
that treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.” See S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, ¶ 250
(2000).
178 COVID 19 Brief: Impact on the Economies of Low-Income Countries,
U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP COALITION (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.usglc.org/coronavirus/economies-of-developing-countries/.
179 Gami Investments Inc. v. The Gov’t of the United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, ¶ 114 (2014).
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defined set of interests.180 In general, IIAs distinguish between
two types of these provisions: so-called “Essential Security
Exceptions” (ESE) and “General Public Policy Exceptions”
(GPPE).181
1. Essential Security Exceptions
ESE describes a group of self-judging IIA-based defenses
that broadly define security interests for which the parties may
deviate from if they deem an act necessary to safeguard such an
interest.182 It must be noted that ESE are not necessarily
restricted to the traditional understanding of national security
as protection against military threats and internal unrest:
indeed, tribunals have recognized that major economic crises
may be covered by ESE.183
However, as no state has ever actively invoked a security
exception to justify its otherwise wrongful conduct so far, it is
difficult to anticipate how tribunals will assess ESE defenses in
Covid-19 related investment proceedings.184 Nevertheless, it
has been argued that tribunals may draw inspiration from the
recent WTO Panel Report Russia – Traffic in Transit,185 which
comprised a detailed analysis of the national security exception
in Art. XXI GATT 1994.186 Most notably, the WTO panel

180 Mao-wei Lo, Legitimate Expectations in a Time of Pandemic: The
Host State’s Covid-19 Measures, its Obligations and Possible Defenses Under
International Investment Agreements 13 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 249, 260
(2020).
181 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 159, 161–62 (distinguishing between the
ESE and General exceptions).
182 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 159.
183 For instance, under the pretext of assessing the necessity of the host’s
measures, the tribunal in CMS v. Argentina argued that Argentina’s
economic relief measures which were taken amidst the Argentine economic
crisis to promote economic and social stability could not generally be excluded
from the scope of the ESE in the underlying Argentina-US BIT. See id. at 160
n.222.
184 Jaemin Lee, The Coronavirus Pandemic and International
Investment Arbitration – Application of ‘Security Exceptions’ Clauses in
Investment Agreements 13 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 185, 193 (2020).
185 See generally Panel Report, Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in
Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (Apr. 5, 2019) (defining the national security
exception in Article 21 of the 1994 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade.)
[hereinafter Russia – Traffic in Transit].
186 Lee, supra note 184.
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concluded that an “essential security interest” relates to the
quintessential functions of the state such as protecting its
population from threats.187 While the Art. XXI GATT 1994
grants states a margin of appreciation in defining their essential
security interests and to act accordingly, this discretion is
limited by the state’s obligation to act in good faith.188 This is
the case where the state’s intention is to address the essential
security interest and not to simply circumvent its obligations.189
Applied to the Covid-19-crisis, the panel’s reasoning would
mean that containing the pandemic and hence protecting
citizens’ lives qualifies as an essential security interest.
Accordingly, states would be allowed under ESE to deviate from
its treaty obligations as long as they act in good faith, i.e. with
the intention to curb the pandemic rather than to circumvent
their treaty commitments.190
As a result, developing countries might successfully invoke
ESE where they regulate bona fide for reasons of public
health.191 However, there are two limiting factors to the
applicability of ESE. First, many old-generation treaties do not
yet contain ESE.192 Second, even where IIAs feature ESE
provisions, their treaty language and scope differ widely.193
Accordingly, while ESE could indeed constitute a promising
defense for states to justify their public health responses, it is
yet difficult to anticipate how tribunals will interpret individual
ESE in the context of Covid-19.
2. General Security Exceptions
In contrast to ESE, GPPE is not limited to the protection of
essential security interests but extends the bases on which a
Russia – Traffic in Transit, supra note 185, at ¶ 7.130.
Id. at ¶¶ 7.131–32.
189 Id. at ¶ 7.133.
190 Lee, supra note 184, at 199.
191 Claudia Annacker et. al., COVID-19: Public Health Emergency
Measures and State Defenses in International Investment Law, MONDAQ
(May 20, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/france/litigation-contracts-andforce-majeure/937558/covid-19-public-health-emergency-measures-and-statedefenses-in-international-investment-law.
192 See Tania Voon, Can International Trade Recover? The Security
Exception in WTO Law: Entering a New Era, 113, AJIL UNBOUND, 45, 45
(2019) (explaining how the security exception has “lain dormant”).
193 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 159.
187
188
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state may deviate from its treaty obligations to a number of
essential interests such as public morals and human, animal,
and plant life.194 However, the scope of GPPE is not unlimited.
Their invocation is bound by the principles of necessity and nondiscriminatory application.195 As GPPE are identical or at least
similar in design to Art. XX GATT 1994, the compliance of a
policy with the provision must be oriented towards the
corresponding three step analysis in WTO Law. 196
Accordingly, the state measure’s objective must correspond
with that of the relevant essential interest described under the
GPPE provision.197 Moreover, the measure must have been
necessary, which is assessed by considering the value of the
policy objective for society, the extent to which the measure
contributes to promote or protect this value and the measure’s
impact on conflicting interests.198 The more important the value
and the protection of the policy objective is for society, the more
the measure is allowed to impair conflicting interests as long as
no equally effective alternative exists.199 Finally, the measure
must neither arbitrarily nor unjustifiably discriminate against
the investor or be made in bad faith.200
While it is clear, from the explicit reference in Art. XX(b)
GATT 1994 to the protection of human life, that the containment
of a severe public health crisis such as Covid-19 constitutes an
essential interest under GPPE provisions, the assessment of the
other preconditions will rely on the individual measure in
question.201 Tribunals will therefore have to balance the
interests of investors with that of the general public to contain
the virus. Considering the enormous threat that Covid-19 poses,
it can be assumed that tribunals will grant states a high degree

194 See id. at 163 n.233 (stating GPPE are usually modelled after the
General Exceptions provision of Art. XX GATT 1994 and hence
predominantly extend their protection to the interests listed under this
provision).
195 Id. at 163.
196 Chaisse, supra note 43.
197 Id. at 163 n.234.
198 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION – TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 560
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 4th ed. 2017).
199 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 159.
200 Schreuer, supra note 105, at 198.
201 VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 198, at 553.
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of deference where they adopt bona fide regulations to curb the
pandemic.202
While it is therefore likely that developing countries could
successfully rely on GPPE to justify their Covid-19 responses, its
relevance is curbed by the fact that GPPE provisions are still
very rarely included in IIAs.203 In 2018, there were only 3.5% of
all IIAs in force.204 Although their number is consistently rising,
the little more than 100 IIAs that include a general exceptions
clause will therefore become relevant in only a very limited
number of cases.205
B. Customary International Law Defenses
IIAs are treaties that set out international obligations in the
form of procedural and substantive safeguards vis-à-vis the
other state party and its investors.206 Therefore, if the state
parties do not comply with the treaty’s provisions, they can be
held financially responsible.207 However, when and how exactly
a state must assume responsibility for its failure to perform an
international obligation is governed by the customary
international law of state responsibility enshrined in the ILC’s
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA).208 Hence, even
where a state violates its IIA obligations vis-à-vis a foreign
investor, it may avert responsibility where the conditions of a
justification under the ARSIWA exist.209
In contrast to IIA-based defenses, justifications under the
law of state responsibility have two decisive advantages for

Chaisse, supra note 43, at 156, 164.
Wolfgang Alschner & Kun Hui, Missing in Action: General Public
Policy Exceptions in Investment Treaties 4 (Ottawa Fac. of L., Working Paper
No. 2018-22, 2018).
204 Id.
205 Alschner & Hui, supra note 203.
206 MARTIN A. WEISS ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44015, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 (2015).
207 Mian Sami Ud Din & Umaira Iqbal Raza, International Investment
Arbitration and the Conduct of National Courts, COURTING LAW. (Feb. 19,
2020), https://courtingthelaw.com/2020/02/19/commentary/internationalinvestment-arbitration-and-the-conduct-of-national-courts/.
208 It is widely accepted that Chapter V of the ARSIWA reflects
customary international law. See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
THE GENERAL PART 250 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
209 Id. at 274–75.
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203
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developing countries. First, as customary international law, the
existence of these defenses does not depend on the inclusion,
language, and scope of the relevant treaty provisions.210 Second,
this also means that their assessment is less subjected to
ambiguous and dogmatic treaty interpretations by tribunals.211
Chapter V of the ARSIWA describes six circumstances that
exclude the wrongfulness and hence the state’s responsibility for
breaches of international obligations: consent (Art. 20 ARSIWA),
self-defense (Art. 21 ARSIWA), countermeasures (Art. 22
ARSIWA), force majeure (Art. 23 ARSIWA), distress (Art. 24
ARSIWA) and necessity (Art. 25 ARSIWA).212 However, the
applicability of consent, self-defense,213 and countermeasures214
are very limited in the context of Covid-19 arbitration.
Accordingly, the following analysis will revolve around the
defenses of force majeure, distress and necessity.
1. Force Majeure
According to Art. 23 of ARSIWA, a state cannot be held
responsible for an internationally wrongful act, if a force
majeure, the occurrence of an extraordinary and unforeseen
event or an irresistible force that is not attributable to the state,
makes it impossible for the state to act in conformity with its
international obligations.215 In order to be able to rely on force
Id. at 217.
See generally U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Investment Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5, at 20 (2015) (discussing the challenges of IIA’s
including “ambiguities in treaty interpretation by arbitral tribunals.”).
212 Simone Olleson, The Impact of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 142 (Oct. 10, 2007) (preliminary
draft) (on file with the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law).
213 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PANDEMICS: A PRIMER 25 (Halsey Diakow &
Juliana Hefern eds., Trusteess of Tufts Coll. 2021).
214 See Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 161 (2008) (Indeed, states
have tried to invoke countermeasures before investment tribunals to justify
their interference with foreign investments. In CPI v. Mexico, the respondent
argued that its infringement of IIA obligations was justified by the preceding
breach of treaty obligations by the other state party. The tribunal thoroughly
rejected Mexico’s argument by pointing out that a countermeasure may only
be invoked against the party breaching the international obligation, not
unconcerned third parties such as the investor.).
215 CRAWFORD, supra note 208, at 295.
210
211
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majeure, the invoking state must establish the aforementioned
three elements: (a) unforeseeability, (b) non-attributability, and
(c) impossibility to comply with its obligations.216
a) Unforeseeability
Unforeseeability necessitates the existence of an unforeseen
event or irresistible force. That is the case where the state did
not have the capacity to avoid or resist the constraint that the
relevant circumstances pose and where the occurrence of said
circumstances was neither foreseen nor easily foreseeable for the
state.217 Indeed, just slightly over a year ago, very few would
have been able to anticipate the occurrence of a public health
crisis of global proportions. Likewise, the unprecedented
manner in which Covid-19 caused loss of human life and
disruption of international trade and business proved to
overburden even the most powerful developed countries.218
Accordingly, tribunals will likely be inclined to agree with
developing countries on the existence of the first element.
b) Non-attributability
Further, the occurrence of the relevant event must not be
attributable to the state, i.e. where the state is either directly
responsible for the occurrence of force majeure or subsequently
assumed responsibility.219 This is not already the case where a
state contributed in some way to the existence of the force
majeure.220 Where a state acted in good faith and unknowingly
contributed to the force majeure, it retains its right to defend its
actions on the basis of Art. 23 ARSIWA.221 Yet, the element of
non-attributability remains somewhat vague. It is neither
entirely clear what substantive threshold a state’s contribution

Chaisse, supra note 43, at 158.
Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 76 (2001) [hereinafter Int’l Law Comm’n].
218 COVID-19 and International Trade: Issues and Actions, OECD (June
12, 2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_1285423ijg8kfswh&title=COVID-19-and-international-trade-issues-andactions&_ga=2.127836749.1580248333.1633395070-1942820127.1633395070.
219 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 118, 158.
220 Id. at 159.
221 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 27, 30.
216
217
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must exceed nor what time frame it covers.222 For instance, both
the specific containment measures during the outbreak and the
more general policies, such as the funding of public health, had
an impact on the development of the pandemic.223 Tribunals will
therefore most likely assess the contribution of states in light of
their individual capacities, which makes it difficult to assume
the likelihood with which the defense will hold up in general.
Given the fact that most states never had to cope with a
comparable disease that incorporated high virality and
asymptomatic transmission, it can be expected that they will
practice a certain leniency towards states in this regard.
c) Impossibility
Finally, the prevailing circumstances must have made it
impossible for the state to comply with its international
obligations.224 Impossibility is to be understood rather strictly.
A force majeure cannot be assumed merely because the
performance of the obligation has become difficult or
burdensome.225 This general perception led tribunals to apply
this standard restrictively, even amidst instances of economic
and political crisis.226 While there is some discrepancy on
whether the relevant threshold amounts to material and
absolute impossibility of performance227 or a slightly more
lenient standard,228 it must be noted that the fulfilment of the
criterion will, in either case, remain very selective and be
reserved only to circumstances of exceptional difficulty. If
tribunals will acknowledge the existence of a force majeure, they
will therefore rely heavily on the relevant obligation and the
reaction by the state. For instance, while imposing an export

Id. art. 4–11.
See Chaisse, supra note 43, at 109, 112 (highlighting several causes
for the delay in addressing COVID-19).
224 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 158.
225 CRAWFORD, supra note 208, at 298.
226 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 246 (2007) (highlighting the restrictive nature of the
impossibility standard, especially concerning the performance of a frustrated
obligation due to political or economic crisis).
227 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 158; Rainbow Warrior Aff. (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20
R.I.A.A. 215, 250 (1990).
228 CRAWFORD, supra note 208, at 299.
222
223
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ban for certain medical items has made it easier for states to
acquire the necessary supplies, they had the choice to refrain
from this measure. Even though this would have made it
considerably more difficult for the state and its public health
institutions to contain the spread of Covid-19, they factually had
the discretion to simply not impose the ban.229 Accordingly,
tribunals will most likely reject the claim that the threshold of
impossibility has been reached.
As a result, developing countries will only be able to make
very limited use of the force majeure defense. While tribunals
will likely determine that the pandemic was unforeseeable and
there is a good chance that its repercussions will not be
attributed to the state, the high threshold of impossibility limits
the defense’s applicability to only the most extreme
circumstances.
2. Distress
Distress is another circumstance that precludes the
wrongfulness of a breach of obligation, cf. Art. 24 ARSIWA.230 It
exists where an internationally wrongful act is committed as the
only reasonable way to safeguard the life of its author or third
parties under his care.231 Whereas force majeure requires a
material impossibility to act differently, distress comprises an
element of choice in the form of a voluntary breach of an
international obligation in the face of peril.232 If developing
countries seek to make a plea of distress to justify their actions
amidst the crisis, they will have to produce evidence that they
fulfil five preconditions that are derived from the wording of Art.
24 ARSIWA.233 This includes (a) a situation of life and death
that (b) relates to an individual with whom the acting entity has

229 Simon Evenett, Sickening thy neighbour: Export restraints on medical
supplies during a pandemic, VOX EU (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://voxeu.org/article/export-restraints-medical-supplies-during-pandemic.
230 Int’l Law Comm’n supra note 217, at 78.
231 ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 125
(Edward Elgar Publ’g 2017).
232 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 604 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
8th ed. 2017).
233 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 78–80 (highlighting the
conditions that must be fulfilled before properly invoking distress to preclude
the wrongfulness of a conduct).
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a special relationship, (c) the absence of other reasonable
alternatives to the measure, (d) its non-attributability to the
state and (e) its proportionality.234
a) Threat to Life
First, a situation must constitute a medical threat to life or
a comparably urgent emergency.235 As Covid-19 is responsible
for millions of deaths and continues to pose a dangerous threat
that particularly targets the vulnerable sections of society,
states will not face exceeding difficulties in confirming this
point.236 On the other hand, this specific condition does relate
exclusively to physical harm. Even though the public health
dimension of Covid-19 is therefore covered by the scope of
distress, this cannot be said for the corresponding economic
recession. Accordingly, the further analysis will exclusively
relate to public health regulation.
b) Special Relationship
Second, there must be a relationship of care between the
acting entity and the protected individuals.237 This does not
extend to the occurrence of general emergencies which are
covered by the defense of necessity. 238 In contrast, distress
seems to be applicable in circumstances where the responsibility
for the wellbeing of a person rests with the acting entity.239
While this implies that the state’s general care of its citizens’
well-being is not sufficient to invoke the plea of distress, things
could be different amidst the current pandemic. Due to the rapid
spread and high virality of Covid-19, it is almost impossible for

Id.
Id. at 79.
236 The Territorial Impact of COVID-19 Managing the Crisis Across
Levels of Government, OECD 3, 8 (updated Nov. 10, 2020), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128287-5agkkojaaa&title=The-territorial-impactof-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-ofgovernment&_ga=2.163937215.1292240561.16338306981131894969.1632586395.
237 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 158.
238 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 80.
239 See id. at 79 (using Rainbow Warrior to show how circumstances of
distress and urgency can affect acting entities’ responsibility for a person’s
wellbeing).
234
235
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individuals to effectively contain the virus and protect
themselves. In this regard, the control over their concrete
wellbeing lies in the hands of the acting state, and only the state
may avert the life-threatening danger posed by the pandemic. It
is therefore possible that tribunals will adopt this interpretation
to the current crisis and accept the existence of a special
relationship.
c) Absence of Reasonable Alternatives
In contrast to force majeure, distress does not require the
complete absence of other available choices to act.240 Yet, from
all the available venues, the employed measure must have been
the only one reasonable for states to avert the threat. This
means, that from all available equally effective alternatives, the
one taken was the one that least impaired the obligation and
hence, states retain a certain flexibility to act.241 If tribunals will
agree on the fact that the employed Covid-19 response was the
only reasonable option, they will heavily rely on the specific
measure in question. For instance, due to the scarcity of
vaccines, the appearance of new, more aggressive Covid-19
mutations, and the limited financial and institutional capacities
of many developing countries, tribunals do not seem to dispose
of other equally effective and available alternatives.
d) Non-attributability
In general, the element of non-attributability corresponds
with the standard under Art. 23 ARSIWA, but additionally
incorporates a particular leniency for life saving measures.242
Accordingly, where a state acted in good faith and unknowingly
contributed to the dangerous situation, it can still rely on the
defense of distress, especially where it must intervene to save its
citizens’ lives.243 This corresponds well with states that employ
Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 78.
CRAWFORD, supra note 208, at 301; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, supra
note 217, at 80 (describing the balance of flexibility that State agents have in
assessing the conditions of their distress).
242 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 80 (proclaiming that saving the
lives of passengers or a crew is an example where leniency is given, as it
precludes wrongfulness).
243 Id. at 79 (explaining the use of distress during situations involving
240
241
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public health measures to contain a deadly virus, where
tribunals could be inclined to practice a certain leniency on this
point.
e) Proportionality
Finally, the measure must not be disproportionate. As
outlined by Art. 24(2)(b) ARSIWA, the defense of distress is
precluded where the measure likely creates a greater peril than
it averts.244 Accordingly, the status quo as it presents itself after
the measure was employed must be compared with the situation
that would have hypothetically existed without the measure.245
In other words, only if the impact of the state’s measure on its
people outweighs its detrimental effects, the plea of distress will
be considered. Indeed, this could become a controversial point
before tribunals in light of diverging opinions concerning the
benefits of the most severe social distancing restrictions like
lockdowns and curfews. Nevertheless, considering again the
high virality and severe danger posed by Covid-19, at least those
measures that are indispensable for containing the spread of the
virus are likely to hold up before tribunals. For instance, the
closure of places that attract large crowds of people in relatively
small, confined spaces that makes it virtually impossible to
comply with even basic social distancing measures would, in all
likelihood, be considered proportionate.
In contrast, the
imposition of limited opening hours for stores that sell essential
household products could be deemed unproportionate where the
policy leads to the stores’ overcrowding and hence increases the
risk of contracting the virus for its customers. Ultimately, the
tribunals’ assessment of proportionality will rely on the actual
capacity of the state to enact and apply nuanced regulations that
consider the detrimental effects of strict social distancing
measures while not losing sight of the primary health objective
which is to effectively contain the further spread of Covid-19. As
it can thus be expected that tribunals will grant a certain
deference to states with limited financial and institutional
capacities, developing countries have good chances to pass the
test of proportionality where they demonstrate sufficient nuance
the misconception).
244 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, art. 24(2)(b).
245 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 159.
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in the design and application of their Covid-19 responses.
As a result, the defense of distress is a justification with a
very narrow scope that will only hold up in the most extreme
situations of life and death. Indeed, as far as it is known,
distress has never been invoked by a state party in an
investment proceeding.246 It must be noted, though, that Covid19 poses a public health emergency of unmatched proportions.
It could be then that tribunals will affirm the existence of a life
and death situation. Nevertheless, the existence of a life and
death situation exclusively relates to the public health
dimension of the current pandemic and disregards measures
that are taken in relation to the ensuing economic crisis. Still,
the plea of distress may play an important role for developing
countries to justify their public health responses and their
chances of success will be reasonably high as long as they adhere
to the preceding principles.
3. Necessity
The final defense set out by Art. 25 ARSIWA is the plea of
necessity.247 Unlike the other ARSIWA defenses, necessity has
been frequently invoked before investment tribunals, and
successfully in some cases. 248 It can be invoked where a state
has no other choice to avert a grave and imminent peril that
threatens an essential state interest without impairing an
essential interest of another state or the global community.249
Yet, it follows from Art. 25(2) ARSIWA that the plea of necessity
is limited to circumstances where the relevant international
obligation allows the invocation of necessity and where the
invoking state did not contribute to the occurrence of the
relevant circumstances.250 Accordingly, an invoking state must
establish that there was (a) an essential interest (b) threatened
with grave and imminent peril, (c) no reasonable alternative
246 Id. at 158 (suggesting the defense of distress would likely not succeed
before an investment tribunal, even when factoring in the very narrow scope
under life and death circumstances in a global pandemic).
247 Chaisse, supra note 43, at 158.
248 Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 219 (2008).
249 SHAW, supra note 232, at 604.
250 Jure Vidmar, The Use of Force as a Plea of Necessity, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 302, 303 (2017).
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available to avert the peril, (d) no relevant third party interest
impaired and (e) neither an explicit exclusion of the plea nor a
relevant contribution of the underlying circumstances by the
invoking state.251
a) Essential interest
An essential interest cannot be generalized, but instead
relies heavily on the circumstances of the specific case.252 The
practice of international courts and tribunals shows that the
existence of an essential interest is not solely limited to
instances that threaten the very existence of the state.253
Indeed, tribunals accepted a wide variety of interests as
satisfying the threshold, including environmental protection,254
health and welfare, and the functioning of essential public
services.255 This makes it very likely that tribunals will consider
the protection of citizens’ health and the functioning of public
health services an essential interest. Moreover, tribunals have
extended the range of essential interests to instances of
economic turmoil that threaten the survival of the state.256 In
light of the unprecedented economic crisis accompanying the
pandemic that severely hit developing countries, it is likely that
tribunals will extend the essential interest element to economic
relief measures.
b) Grave and Imminent Peril
As a second condition, the state must provide that there is
an imminent risk for the identified essential interest to be
severely harmed.257 While complete certainty is not required,
251 Marie Christine Hoelck Thjoernelund, State of Necessity as an
Exemption from State Responsibility for Investments, [2009] 13 Max Planck
U.N.Y.B. 434.
252 Thjoernelund, supra note 251, at 437.
253 Id. at 436.
254 Mari Nakamichi, The International Court of Justice Decision
Regarding the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 9 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 337,
350–51 (2017).
255 Nat’l Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 245
(2008).
256 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 251 (2006).
257 Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally

47

72

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 34.1

the existence of the risk must not be merely potential or
contingent but objectively established on the basis of the
available evidence.258 Additionally, it must be established that
the essential interest faces “peril,” i.e. a severe danger that goes
beyond mere material damage, and that the act is the only
means of protecting that interest. 259 Finally, the imminence of
the risk must be construed as necessitating a high proximity
between the risk and its realization.260 In turn, this means that
the risk may not have materialized where the state acts to avert
its further aggravation.261
After almost a year of living in times of the pandemic, it is
now relatively easy to see how rapidly and severely Covid-19 has
impacted states’ public health and economic capacities.262 On
one hand, the aggravating economic situation brought several
developing countries to the verge of economic collapse.263 And
on the other, the scarcity of vaccines and the limited capacities
of their health care system severely endanger their public health
situation in the face of the newly discovered Covid mutations.264
Against this background, it is rather likely that tribunals will
recognize a state of imminent peril in those developing countries
where a severe aggravation of the economic and public health
situation can be expected in the near future.

Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. L. J. 1, 25 (2000).
258 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 83.
259 CRAWFORD, supra note 208, at 311; Thjoernelund, supra note 251, at
437.
260 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 83.
261 Federica Paddeu & Freya Jephcott, COVID-19 and Defences in the
Law of State Responsibility: Part II, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-stateresponsibility-part-ii/.
262 COVID-19 and International Trade: Issues and Actions, supra note
218, at 2.
263 See Radmilla Suleymanova, Developing countries face economic
collapse in the COVID-19 fight: UN, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/3/30/developing-countries-faceeconomic-collapse-in-covid-19-fight-un (noting the disproportionate impact
COVID has had on already impoverished countries including India and
Africa).
264 Angel Gurría, Sec’y-Gen., OECD, Opening Remarks: Imagining
Emerging Economies in a Post-COVID World - 4th Annual OECD–Emerging
Markets Forum (Apr. 30, 2021).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/2

48

Fall 2021

Corporate Wealth Over Public Health?

73

c) No Reasonable Alternative
Even where a situation exists that would, prima facie,
justify the employment of normally wrongful acts under the
defense of necessity, the plea is precluded where the risk had
already ceased to exist or where the state goes beyond what is
strictly necessary to avert the relevant risk.265 Accordingly,
where lawful, equally effective alternatives exist – even if they
are more onerous or costly – states are barred from invoking the
defense of necessity.266 In practice, the assessment of this
element will strongly depend on the specific circumstances of the
relevant case and the nature of the employed measure. Still, at
times where vaccination rates are extremely low in most LMICs,
and given their limited capacities to act, it can be assumed that
there are no equally effective, less restrictive alternatives
available to curb the pandemic than imposing strict social
distancing measures. Regarding the economic dimension of the
crisis, the assessment depends on the specific measure in
question. For instance, where governments resorted to the
suspension of utility payments, states had the reasonable
alternative to adequately compensate the foreign investors
whose profits were impaired by the measure or confer stimulus
checks to its citizens in the amount of their utility payments,
even if this would have been very costly.267 In contrast, the
situation could be assessed differently, where states are facing a
situation of imminent state default. If there is virtually no other
solution for a state than to resort to the restructuring of its debt,
tribunals might be inclined to negate the existence of reasonable
alternatives.
d) No Opposing Interests
Further, the interest of the state relying on the plea of
necessity must be weighed against the interest of a third state
in relation to which the obligation exists. 268 Accordingly, where
a third party interest that is no less essential than the one
Thjoernelund, supra note 251, at 437–38.
Id. at 438.
267 See generally id. (providing general background information about
international arbitrations and balancing criteria between international and
state interests that led to this conclusion).
268 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 83–84.
265
266
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protected is impaired, the existence of necessity is precluded. 269
The standard of assessing the balance between these interests
is not limited to the subjective perspective of the state invoking
necessity, but an objective one that considers all conflicting
interests.270 As outlined above, tribunals have recognized the
immense value of public health as an essential interest in its
preceding decisions and hence, third party interests that would
outweigh the populations’ well-being are hard to construe. As
Art. 25(1)(b) ARSIWA speaks of obligations “towards a state or
states,” it could be controversial whether this includes the
investors’ interest to enjoy their investment.271 While there are
conflicting views whether IIAs directly confer substantive rights
to investors272 or are merely derivative,273 it is rather safe to
assume that in the majority of cases that only relate to
proprietary interests of investors, those will not suffice to
outweigh developing countries’ essential interest to contain a
public health emergency or avert economic peril.274
e) No Exclusion or Contribution
According to Art. 25(2) ARSIWA the plea of necessity is
further precluded if the relevant obligation excludes the defense
or the invoking state contributed to the underlying
circumstances.275 In the context of investment arbitration, the
former is of very little interest as it relates predominantly to
instances of law or conflict.276 In contrast, claimants may invoke
that necessity is precluded due to states’ contribution to the
current situation. According to the ILC this means that the
contribution must be “sufficiently substantive and not merely

Id. at 83–84.
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 46 (Sept. 25); Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 83–84.
271 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, art. 25.
272 See Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 65 (2008).
273 Archer Daniels Midland Company v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, ¶ 163 (2007).
274 Tillmann Rudolf Braun, State Responsibility and Investment
Protection in the Time of Pandemic, INV. PROT., HUM. RTS., & INT’L ARB.
EXTRAORDINARY TIMES 9 (forthcoming 2021).
275 Id. at 22.
276 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 217, at 84.
269
270
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incidental or peripheral.”277 Yet, the ambiguous decisionmaking by tribunals makes it difficult to anticipate what
threshold they will apply. While some tribunals based their
analysis on the pure causality of states’ measures,278 others have
narrowed the preclusion to instances where states’ contribution
was not “merely incidental or peripheral,”279 or included a
certain degree of fault.280 In essence, a state shall not be able to
profit from its own shortcomings to the detriment of others.281
This could be relevant both regarding the general preparedness
of developing countries for the crises and their specific approach
in containing it.
Although the SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in East Asia in 2002
demonstrated the latent danger posed by globally transmitted
viruses, no government foresaw a public health emergency of
this proportion. Both developing and developed countries alike
were hit mostly unprepared. While it could be argued that
developed countries with relevant financial and public health
capacities could have done more to be properly prepared, this
can hardly be said for developing countries, that even under
regular circumstances rarely had the appropriate means to avert
such an unprecedented crisis. Indeed, tribunals have considered
the limited capacities of developing countries on several
occasions in their assessment,282 and hence, it is possible that
they will assess this point rather generously. Still, if the
relevant measures led to an aggravation of the crisis it must
naturally be assessed on a case by case basis. In this regard, it
could be especially relevant in how far the state responded
belatedly, incoherently, or insufficiently or employed an
inadequate information policy.283 Nevertheless, the assessment
of the Covid-19 response must always be made against the
severity of the crisis and the scarcity of reliable information,
Id.
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
Award, ¶ 356 (2011).
279 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 328 (2005).
280 Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26,
Award, ¶ 711 (2016).
281 Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 311 (2007).
282 Braun, supra note 274, at 32.
283 Id. at 32–33.
277
278
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especially in its early stages. Where a state had no sufficient
data to indicate which measures may effectively contain the
viruses spread and provide effective relief, it is indeed possible
that tribunals will take a rather lenient approach in their
assessment.
In summary, the plea of necessity may provide an effective
defense strategy for developing countries to justify their public
health policies amidst the pandemic. What makes necessity
stand out from other ARSIWA defenses is that its protection may
likely extend to current economic relief measures. Still, the
above analysis should be taken with a grain of salt. Necessity is
construed as a narrow exception and shall only be applied very
restrictively.284 The success of pleas of necessity will ultimately
rely on the current public health and economic situation of the
invoking state. The closer the state is to approaching a situation
of imminent public health or economic breakdown and the less
capacity it has to create alternative venues that may avert this
outcome, the more likely tribunals will be inclined to justify
states’ breaches of IIA obligations under the plea of necessity.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES
On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to draw certain
conclusions on how developing countries may craft resilient
public health responses and streamline their investment
environment to be optimally prepared against investor claims in
upcoming public health emergencies. In this context, the most
promising approach is a multi-facetted one that incorporates
action on treaty, policy design, and justification levels.
First, where old-generation treaties are still in place,
developing countries should make the renegotiation or
replacement of existing IIAs a major foreign policy objective. In
doing so, they should be especially cautious to include the
necessary instruments to guarantee appropriate discretion for
the adoption of emergency public health and economic relief
measures. In particular, IIAs should clearly define the criteria
that must be met to amount to a violation of a substantive treaty
standard and exclude or narrow the applicability to sensitive
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policy areas like public health or taxation.285 This is particularly
important for standards like FET and indirect expropriation
which have been interpreted broadly and ambiguously in the
past.286 Moreover, the preceding assessment has shown that the
inclusion of ESE and GPPE is capable of providing states with
the necessary discretion to adopt regulatory measures where an
essential state interest is impaired.287 The effectiveness of these
reform provisions is out of question. As indicated above, none of
the investment claims filed in 2019 were based on a newgeneration treaty.288 More importantly, the current crisis
provides the reform movement with a strong momentum. The
majority of treaties in force have recently entered a phase where
they can either be renegotiated or terminated.289 Additionally,
the pandemic has made it clear to both developed and developing
countries that old-generation treaties may restrict their capacity
to respond to upcoming public health emergencies.
Consequently, states should seize the opportunity to overcome
the old investment regime and replace it with one that meets its
demands in times of crisis.
285 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership art. 29.3, 29.5, Dec. 30, 2018,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/29.aspx?lang=eng (trying to strike a
balance between investor and host state interests. Instead of excluding public
health measures generally from its scope of application, it takes account of
the restrictive tobacco policies adopted by its member state New Zealand by
barring ISDS claims on this matter. Furthermore, the CPTPP provides its
state parties the opportunity to adopt economic relief measures, but explicitly
restricts their applicability to temporary safeguard measures in times of
economic hardships).
286 COVID 19: Public Health Emergency Measures And State Defenses In
International Investment Law, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (April 28, 2020),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2020/public-healthemergency-measures-and-state-defenses-in-international-investment-lawpdf.pdf.
287 Both ESE and GPPE should be modelled after the relevant provisions
in the GATT 1994. This has the advantage that tribunals may base their
analysis of the provisions on the existing decisions by the relevant WTO
panels and Appellate Bodies, which increases predictability and transparency
for all involved parties. Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties
Contain Public Policy Exceptions?, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 2825, 2826 (2018).
288 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2020, supra
note 36, at 110.
289 International Investment Policymaking in Transition: Challenges and
Opportunities of Treaty Renewal, UNCTAD 1 (June 2013),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/webdiaepcb2013d9_en.pdf.
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Still, even where no new-generation IIA is in place,
developing countries may reduce the risk of investment
arbitration noticeably by emphasising their adherence to the key
principles of non-discrimination, proportionality and due
process of law. For instance, where states seize foreign
investors’ property, this should only be done in a way that
guarantees that the seizure will be repealed as soon as its
purpose has ceased to exist, domestic and foreign investors in
like circumstances are equally subject to the corresponding
measure, and basic standards of due process and legal review
are adhered. Admittedly, this will not always be a valid option
where a sudden outbreak of a public health or economic crisis
makes it inevitable to impose immediate and far-reaching
measures. In these instances, developing countries should act
in conformity with the defense strategies under public
international law.290 Most notably, the plea of distress may
likely act as a strong defense for regulatory action that is taken
in times of public health crises as long as developing countries
take sufficient account of the principles of reasonableness and
proportionality. Likewise, the plea of necessity provides states
with an effective instrument to justify emergency responses in
times of an imminent public health or economic breakdown.
While tribunals will likely take account of the limited capacities
of developing countries and hence grant them a certain degree
of deference, they should nevertheless attempt to assess
diligently if reasonable, less interfering alternatives to their
regulatory action exist.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Covid-19-crisis prompted developing countries to adopt
a multitude of measures that are clearly contravening investor
interests, most notably by altering their operating conditions
and decreasing the profitability of their investments. Even
though many tribunals recognize the states’ sovereign right to
regulate in the public interest, some measures related to
290 See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., International Investment
Agreements Reform Accelerator, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/INF2020/8,
at 2 (2020) (discussing the need to devise policy that will reform oldgeneration treaties thereby reducing risks against state measures to pursue
public policy and cites COVID 19’s as highlighting the importance of this
reform).
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developing countries’ Covid-19 responses may still be found to
violate substantive treaty provisions, especially where oldgeneration IIAs are involved. While this renders the initiation
of investment proceedings possible, their chances of success are
still limited. This is especially due to the fact that states may
invoke several lines of defense to justify their emergency
measures. On the one hand, ESE and GPPE are capable of
providing states with the appropriate regulatory discretion to
act where an essential or security interest is impaired, although
they still play a relatively minor role in investment proceedings.
More importantly, the ARSIWA defenses of distress and
necessity might be the most promising trump cards developing
countries have at their disposal. Still, due to the case by case
approach and the weighing of the circumstances most tribunals
apply, the outcome of investment proceedings cannot be
predicted with appropriate certainty. Nevertheless, developing
countries may be able to enhance the resilience of future public
health responses by replacing old-generation IIAs with
frameworks that grant them the necessary discretion to
effectively respond in times of crises. While it remains uncertain
how long the Covid-19 pandemic will go on and what lasting
impact it will have on the global economy, there is one thing this
crisis has made absolutely clear: in our globalized and
interconnected world, the appearance of the next global public
health emergency is not a possibility, but a certainty – and the
global community must prepare itself in accordance.
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